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Official Diary

Wednesday, 21 January 1953

1. Notified DCI that IAC had been cancelled this week.

2. Informed DCI that the summary evaluation paper had been signed by the President and recommended the appointment of General Bull as DCI's representative. DCI approved.

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3. Informed DCI that [redacted] was now receiving CIA material.

4. Commented at the Deputies' meeting that the situation in Burma was approaching a serious clash between Government troops and KMT. The question of removing the KMT troops was stalled in State Department, and unless action were taken immediately this unfortunate result could not be prevented. It might already be too late. In response to DCI's question of what might be done, I suggested that if State determined to take some action, Ambassador Sebald could be informed and could request the Burmese to withhold their offensive until an opportunity had been given to evacuate the KMT troops. I pointed out that Ambassador Sebald in numerous cables had been emphasizing upon State the urgency of this situation, which approximated a Greek tragedy. DCI phoned Doc Matthews at State and mentioned the urgency of this situation to him. I later had OCI call to the attention of Matthews' office the most recent State cables on this issue.

5. At the morning meeting, commented on the grave need for more vigorous implementation of the Brownell Committee report respecting USCIB. I felt that one excellent solution would be to secure the appointment of Al McCormack as Sec/Def's representative on USCIB matters, succeeding General Magruder. There was some discussion on this point and DCI instructed me to take no action until he and Mr. Dulles had had a chance to think this matter over. I later phoned Bill Jackson and requested that he take no action until he had word from me or had at least spoken to Mr. Dulles. He indicated that he would clear before doing anything on this matter.

6. Requested Mr. Amory to arrange a briefing with Aldrich at 11:30 on Friday.

25X1A9a

7. Chatted with [redacted] on the following points:

25X1A9a 25X1A5a1

a. [redacted] indicated that [redacted] desired a general review as to the value of its external research facilities and I concurred. I expressed, as my personal view, that

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25X1A5a1
[redacted] possessed valuable research facilities but, as yet, we had not learned the most efficient way to utilize them.

25X1A9a
b. [redacted] referred to the difficulty of clearing 25X1A5a1 [redacted] projects within CIA. I indicated that [redacted] 25X1A9a 25X1A9a [redacted] the new liaison officer, was well competent to straighten this out if DDI and DDP gave him his head. Up to now this had been too closely checked 25X1A9a and was also held up by the inability of [redacted] shop to push matters through the DDP complex. I indi- 25X1A9a cated that I would speak to [redacted] and to DDP and suggested that [redacted] do the same. 25X1A9a

25X1A9a
c. Suggested to [redacted] that the recent development of Jew-baiting in Soviet countries suggested a vulnerability that had not been pin-pointed in the [redacted] 25X1A5a1 vulnerability study. I felt that an addendum dealing with this subject would be desirable and [redacted] 25X1A9a undertook to have it done. I also suggested, in the 25X1A5a1 same connection, that [redacted] might find it advisable to make appropriate amendments in the ~~transcribed~~ sanitized version of the study.

25X1A9a
d. [redacted] raised briefly the question of 25X1A5a1 [redacted] relations with the new Jackson Committee on the cold war. He felt that such relations should be through CIA rather than directly with [redacted] and I concurred. 25X1A5a1

25X1A9a
8. [redacted] phoned and requested the identity of the CIA designate on the committee under NSC-79, "U. S. Over-all Objectives". I told him that after discussion with Mr. Dulles we had determined to designate Bill Bundy, who would be in fairly constant touch with both Mr. Dulles and myself.

25X1A9a
9. [redacted] consulted me as to the desirability of a preliminary clearance of the IAC progress report for NSC and I undertook to look over his draft.

25X1A9a
10. Consulted [redacted] as to the schedule for the 25X1A9a
FOIAb6 Friday briefing of the President. [redacted] called back, stated that he and Mr. Cutler had seen the President who desired that CIA daily material go [redacted] who would call to the President's attention items that he

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thought required immediate high-lighting. This, of course, is without prejudice to DCI or CIA's determination that particular items should be brought directly to the White House. As a result, however, the President would not have read the daily flow of material prior to the Friday briefing, which would be in the main oral. I undertook to advise DCI and also consult him as to whether the time currently fixed for the Friday meeting should be continued. Later discussed this with Mr. Dulles. For the present week we shall continue the prior schedule.

11. [redacted] consulted me as to the classification of the semi-annual Atomic Energy Report. Heretofore this has been carried as a scientific intelligence report, but the feeling is that it should be brought within the regular series of NIE, SE, or SIE. One proposal was that it be characterized a National Scientific Intelligence Estimate. I tended to prefer calling it a SIE, and regarding that category as including all specially sensitive estimates with strictly limited distribution. [redacted] undertook to coordinate.

12. Was briefed by [redacted] respecting the [redacted] cable on the similarity between American and British estimates of the likelihood of all-out war. I expressed the view that, although the conclusions were stated in similar terms, the argumentation was so different as to make a substantial difference between UK and US views by reason of the context in which they were placed. I requested that an analytical study be made, which we could send to [redacted] for his guidance.

[redacted]

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